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I. INTRODUCTION
The American judicial system has historically viewed arbitration
clauses in the commercial sector as creatures of contract law. In general,
arbitration clauses are fully enforceable against all parties to the contract
absent proof of fraud or other illegal conduct which would make the
contract void or voidable as a matter of law.' It has been established
that agreements to arbitrate controversies in the commercial setting
preclude the parties from seeking judicial relief2 and are common in
today's business transactions.
Although arbitration agreements have been widely used in commercial
contracts, this is not the case in the area of family law. Historically,
domestic controversies arising in matters of divorce, separation, child
support, and alimony and maintenance were settled through the tradi-
tional judicial process - adversarial confrontation - or another tra-
ditional mediating institution such as the family, the church, and the
community.
One response to these problems was a demand for more judges and more
courtrooms; another was a search for alternatives to the courts. In part,
this search was a product of disillusion with courts [due] to what many
perceived to be unrestrained adversariness and the unreasonably high cost
of adjudication; in part, it was a product of a growing mood of
antiprofessionalism. 3
Although matrimonial matters are often considered a matter of con-
tract, such controversies have been handled as contractual disputes only
recently. One reason for the differentiation between the use of arbitration
in the commercial context and its use in the domestic context is the
varied nature of domestic law from one state to the next.4 This differ-
entiation, however, has narrowed in recent years. Currently, actions to
enforce provisions of a separation agreement are subject to the same
general principles of law as actions to enforce other contracts.5 This
trend has grown out of the increasing use of alternative means of dispute
1. G. GOLDBERG, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 5-6 (2d ed.
1983).
2. Id. at 5.
3. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 4 (1985).
4. Family law is almost strictly a matter of state law. See H. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW
IN A NUTSHELL 2 (2d ed. 1986).
5. There is a multitude of case law involving separation agreements with provisions
to submit matrimonial disputes arising out of such agreements to arbitration. These cases
treat such provisions as contractual obligations and apply contract theories of law to settle
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resolution in the judicial arena. With increasing frequency couples are
using alternative methods such as mediation, negotiation, and conciliation
to resolve their differences over property distribution, custody, visitation
rights, alimony, and child support, while at the same time avoiding the
disadvantages inherent in utilizing the traditional judicial process.6
One outgrowth of the use of arbitration clauses in separation agree-
ments is the increase in the use of alternative dispute resolution forums.7
These arbitration clauses typically provide that any controversies arising
out of such agreements be submitted to arbitration.
This Note discusses the effect of one such arbitration clause contained
in a separation agreement as it pertains to arrearages and modification
of child support payments. The questions presented by this case, however,
may also arise in subsequent litigation involving standard arbitration
clauses.
In a recent 3-2 decision, the New York Supreme Court, First De-
partment, held that an ex-wife was precluded from seeking traditional
judicial relief for arrearages of child support payments because the issue
was a matter to be determined by an arbitrator.' The critical issue and
the focal point of this Note is the mandatory nature of the arbitration
provision and the relationship between an action seeking modification
of the separation agreement and one seeking payment of arrearages.
This paper does not propose that arbitration clauses should not be
included in separation agreements or that a substantial change of cir-
cumstances is not an appropriate arbitrable issue. The concern here is
that the New York court has inappropriately expanded the parameters
of a narrow arbitration provision to encompass subjects not necessarily
contemplated by the parties to the arbitration agreement.
the disputes. See generally, e.g., Bowmer v. Bowmer, 50 N.Y.2d 288, 406 N.E.2d 760,
428 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1980); Iseman v. Iseman, 37 N.Y.2d 918, 340 N.E.2d 748, 369
N.Y.S.2d 413 (1975); Kleinerman v. Kleinerman, 118 A.D.2d 405, 499 N.Y.S.2d 415
(1986).
6. H. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW CASES AND QUESTIONS 681-710 (2d ed. 1983).
7. The following have been advanced as reasons for mediation's immense popularity:
1. Avoidance of unnecessary hostility and artificial antagonism that can destroy
all chances of cooperation in constructing a settlement.
2. A measure of client autonomy in constructing the solutions - which is generally
agreed to increase the chances of voluntary adherence to the agreement in future
years.
3. Avoiding the traditional two-attorney fight in the settlement process (to say
nothing of litigation) - which holds out much promise of reducing costs.
Crouch, Divorce Mediation and Legal Ethics, 16 FAM. L. Q. 219, 219-20 (1982).
8. Egol v. Egol, 118 A.D.2d 76, 503 N.Y.S.2d 726 (1986), affd, 68 N.Y.2d 893,
501 N.E.2d 584, 508 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1986).
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II. LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF EGOL v. EGOL
This case presented two major procedural questions which were
addressed by the court: (1) whether the provision in the agreement to
arbitrate was compulsory, and (2) whether the defendant's omission of
the preclusion notice in his demand for arbitration rendered the demand
invalid on its face.9 As for the former issue, this Note will take the
position that the arbitration provision contained in the Egols' separation
agreement was not mandatory, but permissive. Further, even if the
provision was mandatory, the matter to be arbitrated was the modification
of the initial amount of support payments, not arrearages, since modi-
fication was the only subject explicitly made subject to arbitration in
the divorce agreement. Given that the arbitration provision was per-
missive, however, plaintiff should not have been precluded from seeking
recovery of the arrearages through litigation.
III. THE FACTS OF EGOL v. EGOL
In February 1984, Maria and David Egol's 10-year marriage ended
in divorce. The divorce settlement included a provision for maintenance
9. Id. at 79, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 728. The demand for arbitration under Civil Practice
Law and Rules section 7503(c) (1980), [hereinafter CPLR] did not come until February
12, 1985, long after defendant's initial section 7503(a) invocation of arbitration was
erroneously rejected. It is thus unnecessary for us to reach the question of failure to
include a preclusion notice in the demand for arbitration. Moreover, omission of such a
notice merely renders open-ended the period within which a party served has to seek a
stay of arbitration. Such omission precludes the party seeking arbitration from relying
upon the time limitation on seeking a stay. The demand for arbitration is not thereby
rendered ineffective. [citations omitted].
CPLR section 7503(c) states in relevant part:
(c) Notice of intention to arbitrate. A party may serve upon another party a
demand for arbitration or a notice of intention to arbitrate, specifying the agreement
pursuant to which arbitration is sought and the name and address of the party serving
the notice, or of an officer or agent thereof if such party is an association or
corporation, and stating that unless the party served applies to stay the arbitration
within twenty days after such service he shall thereafter be precluded from objecting
that a valid agreement was not made or has not been complied with and from
asserting in court the bar of a limitation of time. Such notice or demand shall be
served in the same manner as a summons or by registered or certified mail, return
receipt requested. An application to stay arbitration must be made by the party
served within twenty days after service upon him of the notice or demand, or he
shall be so precluded. Notice of such application shall be served in the same manner
as a summons or by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. Service of
the application may be made upon the adverse party, or upon his attorney if the
attorney's name appears on the demand for arbitration or the notice of intention to
arbitrate. Service of the application by mail shall be timely if such application is
posted within the prescribed period....
CPLR § 7503(c) (1980).
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and child support in the amount of $115,000 per year plus an additional
$30,000 for medical, educational and summer camp expenses to be paid
by David Egol for their two children.' 0 Their divorce agreement included
an arbitration provision stating:
Should the husband suffer a substantial, adverse and involuntarily [sic]
change in his financial circumstances, making his support obligations under
this Agreement inequitable or a substantial hardship for him, the parties
shall negotiate a modification of his obligations, consistent with their then
financial circumstances. On a failure of the parties to agree upon such a
modification, either party may submit such dispute to arbitration in New
York City, in accordance with the Rules of the American Arbitration
Association, and judgment upon any award rendered in such arbitration
may be entered in any court of competent jurisdiction."
In late January 1984, before judgment on the divorce settlement was
entered, defendant, Mr. Egol, lost his job. In May 1984, he obtained
other employment with a salary of $250,000, half of his prior salary. 12
On February 15, 1984, defendant's attorney wrote to plaintiffs attorney
that as of March 1, defendant would be unable to make the agreed
upon payments in the future because of his change in employment
status. 3 Beginning in March, defendant began paying plaintiff $2,500
per month and plaintiff accepted, without prejudice. 4 Defendant re-
quested that plaintiff refrain from initiating any action against him until
the litigation between himself and his previous employer had been
completed. In correspondence and meetings, the parties agreed to refrain
from instituting arbitration at that time.' 5
When defendant's payments had fallen more than $54,000 short of
the amount stated in the agreement, plaintiff commenced suit for
arrears. 6 Defendant cross-moved pursuant to Civil Practice Laws and
Rules section 7503(a) to compel arbitration. The Special Term inter-*
preted the provision for arbitration as permissive, rather than compulsory,
and ruled that defendant had waived his right to arbitration by failing
to give notice of the dispute for such resolution. The Special Term
denied defendant's application to compel arbitration and granted plaintiff
judgment for eight months of arrearages.' 7
10. Egol v. Egol, 118 A.D.2d 76, 77, 503 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (1986), affd, 68 N.Y.2d
893, 501 N.E.2d 584, 508 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1986).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 78, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 728.
14. Id.
15. Id. At this point there was no negotiation to modify the payments. It appears to
be a mutual postponement agreement.
16. Id.
17. Id. Arrearages were granted for March, 1984, the first month that Mr. Egoi did
not remit the appropriate amount and for each additional month preceding the filing of
the action in the trial court by Mrs. Egol in October, 1984.
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Within one week, before Special Term's order was settled, defendant
served a demand for arbitration under CPLR section 7503(c), and moved
to reargue the prior decision.' 8 Plaintiff moved for an additional money
judgment and to stay arbitration. The court adhered to its prior decision,
granted plaintiff's motion to stay arbitration under CPLR section 7503(b)
on the ground that it lacked compulsory preclusion notice required by
CPLR section 7503(c), and granted plaintiff an additional money judg-
ment covering four more months of arrears. 9 Defendant appealed both
orders. The New York Supreme Court, First Department, decided, as
a matter of law, to vacate the judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
granted the defendant's cross motion to compel arbitration.2 0
IV. NEW YORK STATUTORY LAW ON ARBITRATION
A. Arbitration Law in General v. Arbitration of Matrimonial Disputes
The Civil Practice Law Rules2' delineate New York law in the area
of arbitration. The rules provide that:
A written agreement to submit any controversy thereafter arising or any
existing controversy to arbitration is enforceable without regard to the
justiciable character of the controversy and confers jurisdiction on the courts
of the state to enforce it and to enter judgment on an award. In determining
any matter arising under this article, the court shall not consider whether
the claim with respect to which arbitration is sought is tenable, or otherwise
pass upon the merits of the dispute.22
The use of arbitration in matrimonial disputes is codified in section
C7501:7, 23 which is titled "Arbitration of Matrimonial Disputes." It
does not provide for arbitration rules different from those stated for
arbitration in general. Instead, section 7501:7 merely provides a synopsis
of the case law which addresses the issues affecting arbitration provisions
of matrimonial disputes. There appears to be "no analytical difference
between matrimonial and commercial arbitration."2 4 Therefore, the same
types of problems result from arbitration agreements in matrimonial
disputes as result from commercial disputes - problems of construction,
reformation, and interpretation.
Judge Fein, writing for the majority in Egol, states that the Egols'
agreement to arbitrate is compulsory and, "[t]he only permissive as-
18. Id.
19. Id. at 78-79, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 728.
20. Id. at 82-83, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 731. The notice requirement will not be discussed
in this Note.
21. CPLR § 7501 (1980).
22. Id.
23. See id. at § C7501:7.
24. CPLR § C7501:7 (1980), Cumulative Annual Pocket Part at 24. See also Bowmer
v. Bowmer, 50 N.Y.2d 288, 293-94, 406 N.E.2d 760, 762-63, 428 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1980).
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pect...is that which affords either party the opportunity to initiate
arbitration. '25 On the other hand, Judge Ellerin posits in a dissenting
opinion - focusing on that part of the agreement which provides that,
"[e]ither party may submit such dispute to arbitration" 26 - that the
issue of arrears was properly before the court because the arbitration
provision was permissive in nature. This is a classic case of conflict
between reformation, modification, and interpretation.
It has been explained that:
In reformation, the arbitrator rewrites the contract to correct a mistake in
the language so that the written contract accurately reflects what the parties
agreed upon. In modification, however, there is no mistake in the drafting
of the contract, but the circumstances have changed since the contract was
written and the arbitrator, in effect, writes a new agreement for the parties.
To assure the sanctity of contract and to enable the parties to order their
affairs in reliance upon their agreements, it may well be that the Court of
Appeals will simply refuse to find that the parties have conferred upon the
arbitrator the power to modify a contract in the absence of express arbitration
language to that effect.27
Under the terms of the Egol agreement, Mr. Egol was ordered by
the court to pay a total of $145,000 per month based on a $500,000
salary. A short time after the order was made, Mr. Egol's change in
employment resulted in his salary being reduced by half. Instead of
requesting negotiation or arbitration to get the amount of the payment
reduced, however, Mr. Egol fell behind in payments. Had Mr. Egol
initiated action immediately, there would be no controversy over whether
the arbitrator could modify the payments due to the substantial change
in his financial circumstances because the agreement explicitly contem-
plates such action. Only a one month payment period had elapsed.
Instead, Mr. Egol only requested that Mrs. Egol refrain from instituting
any action against him until he could work out his legal problem with
his former employer. Thus, the court order granting the settlement went
undisturbed. Mr. Egol was still obligated to pay the support as it
accrued.
Hence, when Mr. Egol fell behind in his obligation to pay, the sum
accrued was due and owing to the plaintiff and their children. Therefore,
the amount in arrears is subject to the terms of the initial court order
25. Egol v. Ego], 118 A.D.2d 76, 79, 503 N.Y.S.2d 726, 729 (1986).
26. Id. at 84, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 732 (Ellerin, J., dissenting in part).
27. CPLR § C7501:7, Supplementary Practice Commentaries, by Joseph M. Me-
Laughlin 28 (1980). See In re Arbitration Between SCM Corp. v. Fisher Park Lane Co.,
40 N.Y.2d 788, 358 N.E.2d 1024, 390 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1976) (the court held that under
a broad arbitration clause, arbitrators have complete power to fashion appropriate remedies
including the power to reform a contract. An expansive reading of the Bowmer case,
however, might suggest that even under a broad arbitration clause arbitrators lack the
power to modify a contract).
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to pay and should not be treated as part and parcel of any subsequent
order for modification. In short, under the Egol agreement, only pro-
spective modification of terms, not arrearages, is an arbitrable issue.
The majority position in Egol, in effect, allows the arbitrator to
modify the agreement between the parties by encompassing the issue
of arrearages within the parameters of the stated arbitrable issue of
modification. In essence, the contract between the parties would be
rewritten. Only, in this case, it would be rewritten not just to reflect a
change in circumstances, but to add a provision not previously agreed
upon by the parties. It is clear that this is not a matter of reformation
because the parties did not incorporate arrearages in the arbitration
clause for future modification of payments. Indeed, had they done so,
there would be no debate over the compulsory nature of the clause.
There is no evidence in the record to show that there was mutual assent
or a "meeting of minds"28 over this aspect of the child support payments.
The purpose of the child support payments is to support the Egol
children in a manner to which they are accustomed (i.e. to protect their
best interests). It would be stretching the truth, if not the imagination,
to say that at the time of the initial agreement Mrs. Egol gave her
consent - absent a specific grant of authority - to allow Mr. Egol
to avoid or default on child support payments and not be held judicially
accountable. Moreover, such a broad interpretation of separation agree-
ments like the one in question here, which does not clearly and une-
quivocally address arrearages, will, in fact, have the inevitable effect
of making agreements and court orders in this area easily avoidable.
Such treatment will render an already troubled area of the law even
more troublesome given the difficulty which currently exists in effectively
enforcing child support and maintenance payments.
Given that there is nothing in the Egol case to indicate that arrearages
were discussed as a part of the agreement, the majority is inappropriately
expanding the parameters of the agreement as well as the arbitrator's
actual authority.
[T]he power to formulate flexible solutions cannot be used as a bootstrap
for an unpredictable expansion of the parameters of arbitral authority. 'By
relegating the issue of arrears to the arbitrator in this case, the majority is
"unpredictably" expanding the parameters of the arbitrator's authority and
submitting a dispute which the parties themselves did not agree was subject
to arbitration.'29
In expanding arbitral authority, the court is ignoring the best interest
28. Egol v. Egol, 118 A.D.2d 76, 84, 503 N.Y.S.2d 726, 732 (1986) (Mr. Egol asserted
that there was a meeting of the minds over the question of the arrearages).
29. Egol v. Egol, 118 A.D.2d 76, 84, 503 N.Y.S.2d 726, 732 (1986) (quoting Bowmer
v. Bowmer, 50 N.Y.2d 288, 296 (1980)).
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of the child by overlooking the possible adverse effect of such an
expansive application in the present case. If the arbitrator totally dis-
regards the arrearages, and it may, coupled with the possibility that a
sum less than the initially agreed upon amount will be awarded, the
standard of living of the Egol children will be directly and materially
affected. Mrs. Egol is not merely seeking to recover alimony payments
for herself, but payments owed to their minor children. The defendant
did not comply with the agreement. Therefore, the plaintiff should have
been allowed to proceed through the traditional judicial process to seek
redress of her grievance.
Because Mr. Egol did not make his motion to compel until the action
was decided adversely to him, the amount of arrearages prayed for in
the initial suit and the appeal was due and owing under a valid settlement
agreement which had not been modified. Although there was an agree-
ment made for Mrs. Egol not to force arbitration until Mr. Egol settled
his legal problem with his previous employer, there is no evidence in
the record to suggest that Mr. Egol requested a modification at the
time the agreement was made to postpone arbitration. At best, the
record suggests that the agreement was merely a temporary reprieve or
postponement, not a modification or a grant of immunity. If anything,
this suggests that Mr. Egol's intention was to pay the amounts owed.
He did not indicate otherwise until Mrs. Egol initiated the suit for the
backpayments.
B. A Systematic Approach in Determining the Applicability Of Arbi-
tration Agreements
Under New York statutory law, there are three crucial questions
which must be addressed in determining whether arbitration clauses
may be invoked. There must be a determination that: (1) the agreement
in question is valid, (2) any and all conditions precedent are met prior
to arbitration, and (3) the arbitration is sought within the time stated
by the statute of limitations.30
Whether an agreement is in fact valid is a question of judicial
determination. "If the court determines that the parties had not made
an agreement to arbitrate, that concludes the matter and a stay of
arbitration will be granted or the application to compel arbitration will
be denied. '' 3' In Egol, there is no question that the parties have entered
30. CPLR §§ 7503, C7503:1, C7503:2, C7503:3, C7503:4 (1980).
31. County of Rockland v. Primiano Constr. Co., 51 N.Y.2d 1, 7, 409 N.E.2d 951,
953, 431 N.Y.S.2d 478, 481 (1980). See also In re Marlene Inds. Corp. [Carnac Textiles],
45 N.Y.2d 327, 380 N.E.2d 239, 408 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1978); In re Riverdale Fabrics Corp.
[Tillinghast-Stiles Co.], 306 N.Y. 288, 118 N.E.2d 104 (1954); In re Doughboy, Ind.
[Pantasote Co.], 17 A.D.2d 216, 233 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1962).
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into a valid agreement, however, the inquiry does not end here. Once
the court determines that a valid agreement exists, it must also determine
whether "the particular agreement that [the parties] made was of limited
or restricted scope and the particular claim sought to be arbitrated is
outside that scope.1 32 If the latter is determined, there will be a stay
of arbitration or a denial of the motion to compel arbitration.
It is regarding whether the particular claim sought to be arbitrated
is outside the scope of the parties' agreement that the majority opinion
in Egol and the dissent begin to differ. It is the contention of the
majority that the arrearages indeed came within the scope of the
arbitration agreement; 33 however, the dissent takes the contrary position.3 4
Although not expressly stated, it is evident that the majority is of the
opinion that modification of child support payments encompasses the
dispute over arrearages. This being the case, the majority states that
Mrs. Egol could not bypass arbitration and recover the delinquent
payments through litigation.35 Hence, Mrs. Egol's only alternative is to
submit her claim to arbitration and comply with the arbitrator's decision.
Given the proper context, this would be consistent with the enforcement
functions of the arbitration process. It is inconsistent with the enforce-
ment function, however, to restrict the question of arrearages under the
Egol agreement to arbitration absent an unequivocal agreement to do
so. This does not mean that arbitration is the wrong procedure in every
case where arrearages and modification are at issue; however, when the
parties have not unequivocally provided for it in the agreement, arbi-
tration is not appropriate. Nevertheless, the court took the position that
arbitration was Mrs. Egol's only recourse, stating that:
This is not a case where the arbitrator is asked to reform the instrument.
The arbitrator is called upon only to interpret it. The subject matter is
plainly covered by the language of the agreement....It is the function of the
arbitrator to resolve questions of interpretation of the contract once it is
determined that the arbitration clause is, by its terms, applicable to the
dispute in issue..., unless the issue is one of compliance with express conditions
precedent to arbitration.36
C. Does An Agreement to Arbitrate Modification of Support Payments
Incorporate Arrearages Under New York Statutory Law?
It is necessary at this point to examine the appropriateness of the
32. County of Rockland v. Primiano Constr. Co., 51 N.Y.2d 1, 7, 409 N.E.2d 951,
953 (1980). See Gangel v. De Groot, 41 N.Y.2d 840, 362 N.E.2d 249, 393 N.Y.S.2d
698 (1977).
33. Egol v. Ego], 118 A.D.2d 76, 81, 503 N.Y.S.2d 726, 730 (1986).
34. Id. at 84, 503 N.Y.S.22 at 732 (Ellerin, J., dissenting in part).
35. Id. at 82, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 730.
36. Id. at 81, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 730.
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position taken by the majority. Similar to the Egol dissent, this author
takes the position that modification and arrearages are two separate
issues; therefore, the express provision to arbitrate modification of pay-
ments does not, per se, mandate that a dispute over arrearages is an
arbitrable matter. Such an argument necessitates an examination of
New York law. New York Domestic Relations Law provides that "[t]he
purposes of [Article 3-A] is to secure support in civil proceedings for
dependent spouses and children from persons legally responsible for
their support."37 However, nowhere in Article 3-A or the relevant com-
mentaries is there an express or implicit statement to suggest that, in
light of the underlying premise of this provision, arrearages of child
support payments are encompassed in the modification of such payments.
In fact, none of the statutory provisions address this point at all.
In further support of the proposition that the majority in Egol
inappropriately meshed the question of arrears and modification, the
commentary to CPLR section 7501:7, Arbitration of Matrimonial
Disputes38 posits that "[a]lthough the question of how much support
should be given to a spouse is arbitrable.... the Court of Appeals has
demonstrated a disinclination to find that the parties have agreed to
confer such power upon arbitrators unless the arbitration language is
absolutely clear."3 9 Hence, "[a]bsent a clear, unequivocal agreement to
the contrary, it must be taken for granted that the [parties] did not
intend to refer a particular matter to arbitration. '40
D. What Constitutes a Condition Precedent within the Meaning of
CPLR Section 7503?
This brings the discussion to the second question presented by CPLR
section 7503. Here, the requirement is that after determining that the
agreement to arbitrate is valid and drawing the conclusion that the
claim sought to be arbitrated comes within the scope of the agreement,
the court must then determine, (1) whether there are any conditions
precedent, and (2) whether -the parties have complied with such
conditions. 41
37. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 30 (McKinney 1984).
38. CPLR § 7501:7, Supplementary Practice Commentaries by Joseph M. McLaughlin
27 (1980).
39. Id. at 27 (citing Bowmer v. Bowmer, 50 N.Y.2d 288, 406 N.E.2d 760, 428
N.Y.S.2d 902 (1980)).
40. Id. at 27 n.31. See City of Plattsburgh v. Local 788 and American Federation
of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, 108 A.D.2d 1045, 485 N.Y.S.2d
618 (1985); Just In-Material Designs v. I.T.A.D. Associates, 94 A.D.2d 103, 463 N.Y.S.2d
202 (1983), affd 61 N.Y.2d 882, 462 N.E.2d 1188, 474 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1984); Willink
v. Webster Teachers Ass'n, 81 A.D.2d 1008, 440 N.Y.S.2d 100 (1981).
41. County of Rockland v. Primiano Constr. Co., 51 N.Y.2d 1, 5, 409 N.E.2d 951,
952 (1980); CPLR § C7503:3 (1980).
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The concept of what constitutes a condition precedent has created a
number of controversies. 42 The court in N.Y. Plaza Bldg. Co. v. Op-
penheim, Appel. Co. held that:
In distinguishing between conditions precedent to be passed upon by the
court and procedural stipulations to be resolved by the arbitrators the guiding
principal is: "Whether the particular requirement falls within the jurisdiction
of the courts or of the arbitrators depends on...whether it is in essence
prerequisite to entry into the arbitration process or a procedural prescription
for the management of that process.
43
Hence, when the conditions precedent have not been met the court will
bar/stay arbitration. This determination depends largely upon the breadth
of the arbitration provision. If the arbitration clause is narrow, "[t]he
court is to determine issues of timeliness and notice." 44 If the provision
is broad, timeliness and notice should be resolved by the arbitrator.45
The Egol court concluded that there were no conditions precedent
incorporated into the Egols' separation agreement. 46 In other words, the
provisions of the Egols' agreement involved matters of procedural pre-
scription, not elements of essential prerequisites.
On the contrary, the dissent postulates that the language of the
agreement clearly indicates that the provision to negotiate is the condition
precedent.47 Moreover, since the defendant failed to meet this condition,
his motion to compel arbitration should have been denied.48 The dissent
pointed out that Mr. Egol evaded his obligation for support by manip-
ulating the arbitration procedure. He did not comply with the agreement
and unilaterally reduced the support payments absent arbitration. Mr.
Egol did not try to initiate negotiations or action to modify his obligation.
Consequently, the plaintiff's motion to stay arbitration should have been
granted and the plaintiff should not have been precluded from seeking
recovery of the stated arrearages from March through October 1984
by way of litigation.49 While the majority conceded the fact that the
defendant unilaterally modified the payments and did not cooperate by
42. CPLR § C7503:3 (1980).
43. N.Y. Plaza Bldg. Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel. Co., 103 A.D.2d 203, 207, 479
N.Y.S.2d 217, 220 (1984) (quoting County of Rockland v. Primiano Constr. Co., 51
N.Y.2d 1, 9, 109 N.E.2d 951, 958, 431 N.Y.S.2d 478, 485 (1980). See In re United
Nations Dev. Corp. v. Norkin Plumbing Co., 45 N.Y.2d 358, 363-64, 380 N.E.2d 253,
408 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1978); Teplitsky v. Douglaston Golf Practice Range, Inc., 64 A.D.2d
578, 407 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1978).
44. N.Y. Plaza Bldg. Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel. Co., 103 A.D.2d 203, 207, 479
N.Y.S.2d 217, 220 (1981).
45. County of Rockland v. Primiano Constr. Co., 51 N.Y.2d 1, 6, 409 N.E.2d 951,
952 (1980).
46. Egol v. Egol, 118 A.D.2d 76, 81-82, 503 N.Y.S.2d 726, 730 (1986).
47. Id. at 84, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 732.
48. Id. at 85, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 732-33.
49. Id.
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participating in the negotiation process, Judge Fein went on to say that
defendant's action did not affect his right to compel arbitration just as
it did not effect a waiver of the plaintiff's rights.5 0 In holding there
was no failure to meet a condition precedent, it was necessary to submit
the matter to the arbitrator for disposition.
Regarding whether the defendant, in fact, failed to meet the conditions
precedent contained in the agreement, this author agrees with the
majority that the agreement in question does not present a question of
condition precedent. The provision to negotiate any disagreement prior
to arbitration, even if it is a condition precedent, was complied with
even though the defendant later refused to continue with the procedure.
The requirement was not that a mutual agreement had to evolve from
the negotiation process, it was only that it be initiated prior to challenging
the controversy through arbitration. In fact, the provision expressly states
that, "[o]n a failure of the parties to agree upon such a modification
[due to a breakdown of negotiations], either party may submit such
dispute to arbitration.....' Indeed there was a breakdown in negotiations
when the defendant refused to continue with negotiations over arrears
and modification of payments. Therefore, the question again becomes
whether arrearages are part and parcel of modification or whether they
are two separate obligations which should be handled separately. It is
true that both arise out of the primary obligation of support. However,
arrearages are default payments due under the initial agreement and
should be valid until collected. This is not in opposition to the position
taken by New York and other jurisdictions which allow for the modi-
fication of support payments in cases of significant changes in circum-
stances - whether this is done by court order or by the arbitrator. But
until such a procedure is initiated, any amounts accrued under the
initial order should be enforceable in a court of law.
V. NEw YORK CASE LAW ON ARBITRATION
IN MATRIMONIAL DISPUTES
It is necessary at this juncture to consider available New York
precedent in the area of matrimonial disputes. In particular, the focal
point will be the effects of separation agreements with provisions to
submit disputes pertaining to support and maintenance to arbitration.
In Matter of Hill52 and Arbitration Between Michelman and Michel-
50. Id. at 80, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 729.
51. Id. at 77, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 728.
52. 199 Misc. 1035, 104 N.Y.S.2d 755 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951) (the parties entered into
a separation agreement which, inter alia, provided that if either should relocate to another
city or state, upon the failure of the parties to agree to new custody or visitation rights,
the matter was to be arbitrated. The wife notified the husband of her plans to relocate
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man, 3 the New York Supreme Court held that matters of custody and
visitation so basically affect a child's welfare that a court may not, in
disregard of its traditional role as parens patriae, relegate the question
to arbitration. 4 However, in Sheets v. Sheets,5 which overruled both
Hill and Michelman, the court held that although the courts should
retain ultimate responsibility for the welfare of the child, the informality
and economy of arbitration could well serve as an initial forum in
bringing the parties together.56 Today, there remains no question that
matrimonial disputes affecting support as well as custody may be sub-
mitted to arbitration upon agreement of the parties in marriage disso-
lution cases. So long as the matter in controversy has been expressly
and unequivocally set out in the agreement, the issue should not be
subject to judicial determination.
One of the leading cases in New York on arbitration provisions in
separation agreements is Bowmer v. Bowmer.57 This case involved a
separation agreement which provided that the husband pay alimony and
support for three minor children. The husband informed his wife that
due to a change in his financial circumstances, he would, inter alia,
reduce his support payment obligation.5 8 The separation agreement con-
tained a provison that read in pertinent part: "Any claim, dispute or
misunderstanding arising out of or in connection with this Agreement...or
any matter herein made the subject matter of arbitration, shall be
arbitrated."59 When the husband unilaterally reduced the support pay-
ments, the wife invoked arbitration to recover the arrears. The husband
then made a motion to stay the arbitration and simultaneously moved
to compel arbitration on the issue of whether he was entitled to downward
modification of his obligation. 60 This case reached the New York Court
of Appeals which postulated that:
Arbitration clauses are by now familiar provisos in separation agreements.
Indeed, aside from expressing the parties preference for a means of dispute
so that new arrangements could be made. Upon his failure to answer, she initiated
arbitration. The court held that regardless of agreement of the parties, determination of
custody of children was the prerogative of the court).
53. 5 Misc.2d 570, 135 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) (the court denied motion
to compel arbitration that visitation rights cannot be made the subject of arbitration).
54. In re Hill, 199 Misc. 1035 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951); Arbitration Between Michelman
and Michelman, 5 Misc.2d 570 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954); CPLR § 7501 (1980).
55. 22 A.D.2d 176, 254 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1964) (the husband and wife entered into a
separation agreement giving the wife custody of the children. The wife subsequently
moved to Florida and obtained a divorce. The husband demanded arbitration on grounds,
inter alia, of alienation of affection and violation of visitation rights).
56. CPLR § 7501 (1980).
57. Bowmer v. Bowmer, 50 N.Y.2d 288, 406 N.E.2d 760, 428 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1980).
58. Id. at 292, 406 N.E.2d at 761.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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resolution more informal, more expedient and possibly less costly than
litigation.... an arbitration provision may well have been intended to furnish
insulation from the potential for notoriety and other stresses that so often
accompanies the airing of marital disputes in court.... Moreover, resort to
the arbitral forum may afford the spouses an opportunity to have their
grievances heard by someone who they think may be especially well qualified
in matrimonial matters.6'
Because the agreement was not clear and unequivocal, the court held
that Mrs. Bowmer was entitled to the arrearages and could not be
compelled to arbitrate the issue of arrearages since she never agreed
to do so.
The following year, the New York Supreme Court, Second Depart-
ment, decided the case of Avery v. Avery, 62 which involved a separation
agreement wherein the husband was to pay child support in a specified
amount and subsequently failed to keep up with the payments. The
wife sought recovery of the arrearages and upward modification .6 Their
agreement contained language to the effect that "any dispute or mis-
understanding arising out of, or in connection with this Agreement," is
to be submitted to arbitration. 64 The court found that this provision
encompassed the issue of arrearages because it was in connection with
the agreement.65 Hence, the court held that the wife's causes of action
seeking judgment for arrearages and an upward modification in the
amount of child support would be stayed on condition that the husband
brought a motion to compel arbitration.66
A clear distinction can be drawn between the agreement in Avery
and the one in Egol. In Avery, it was the broad "catch-all" phrase
which the court utilized to include arrears as an inseparable by-product
of modification. Conversely, the Egol's agreement as stated by the court
does not include this broad language. The Egol agreement is more
specific and limited in scope such that the question of arrears would
have to be "bootstrapped" into the modification provision. As the dissent
in Egol states, "[i]mplicit in the language of the provision is the
requirement that the originally agreed upon amount be continued until
a reduction be affected.... [I]t nowhere makes arbitration mandatory or
indicates that the question of reduction prior to arbitration be submitted
to that forum. ' 67 Because the clause in Egol is more limited in scope,
61. Id. at 293, 406 N.E.2d at 761.
62. 81 A.D.2d 849, 438 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1981).
63. Id. at 850, 438 N.Y.S.2d 855.
64. Id. at 851, 438 N.Y.S.2d 856.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Egol v. Egol, 118 A.D.2d 76, 84, 503 N.Y.S.2d 726, 732 (1986) (Ellerin, J.,
dissenting in part).
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it was inappropriate for the court in this case to include arrears as a
component of modification. "[A]s with such provisions in the commercial
context generally, the rule is clear that unless the agreement to arbitrate
expressly and unequivocally encompasses the subject matter of the
particular dispute, a party cannot be compelled to forego the right to
seek judicial relief and instead submit to arbitration. 68
This author further agrees with the dissent in Egol that the arrearages
were a fixed obligation 69 and could not be unilaterally modified without
first submitting the matter to arbitration. Regardless of the fact that
the negotiations failed - indeed because negotiations failed - the
arrears had already been fixed and the duty of the court to enforce
the payments had emerged. The fact that the defendant did not invoke
the arbitration clause on his own behalf to modify the payments should
not be allowed to infringe upon the rights of the plaintiff. "[T]he
plaintiff has a vested right to accrued default payments [even] where
the defendant has slept on his rights."7 In a situation such as this, the
obligee is entitled to seek further judicial determination against the
obligor as a matter of right; denying such recourse flies directly in the
face of equity and justice. Defendants in default of support payments
should not be allowed to renege on their obligation while the plaintiffs,
more accurately, their children, are denied their rights to seek judicial
enforcement of an award that has already been assessed, and unchanged
through judicial intervention, prior to the time at which such right is
invoked.7' This is especially true in this case where the majority conceded
that the plaintiff had not waived any of her rights to relief by agreeing
to delay judicial determination or arbitration when the defendant uni-
laterally reduced the support payments.
It appears that what the court gave with one hand, it took away
with the other. The majority conceded that Mrs. Egol's consent to accept
the initial reduced payment was without prejudice to her rights for the
full amount. Ignoring this concession, however, the court further holds
that the only way plaintiff can recover is to submit to arbitration because
68. Bowmer v. Bowmer, 50 N.Y.2d 288, 293-94, 406 N.E.2d 760, 762, 428 N.Y.S.2d
902, 905 (1980).
69. Egol v. Egol, 118 A.D.2d 76, 84, 503 N.Y.S.2d 726, 732 (1980) (Ellerin, J.,
dissenting in part).
70. Warner v. Warner, 44 A.D.2d 904, 905, 357 N.Y.S.2d 556, 557 (1974) (citing
Toms v. Toms, 188 Misc. 451, 68 N.Y.S.2d 718 (1946).
71. In an effort to alleviate and control the continuous problem of enforcing child
support payments, the Minnesota legislature recently passed a statute which will greatly
enhance, though not fully resolve, a number of the basic problems associated with this
subject matter. The statute is a very detailed one, as a whole. However, the most progressive
aspect is Chapter 403, Article 3, section 89, 518.613, entitled Automatic Withholding,
which provides that:
whenever an obligation for child support or maintenance is initially determined and
ordered or modified by the court in a county in which this section applies, the amount
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that is what she agreed to in the separation agreement. "The agreement
to arbitrate must be express, direct, and unequivocal as to the issue or
disputes to be submitted to arbitration... [and the] clause must be read
conservatively if it is subject to an equivocal reading. '72 This being the
case, it is clear that the plaintiff still has the right to recover the
remaining amount owed.
The distinguishing factor in Egol is the treatment of the payment
of arrearages as if encompassed in the issue of modification of the
initially prescribed support payments. On this point, this author is in
agreement with the dissenting opinion in EgoL "The agreement does
not say that during negotiations or prior to arbitration the husband may,
as was here done, unilaterally reduce his monthly payments...it nowhere
makes arbitration mandatory or indicates that the question of reduction
prior to arbitration be submitted to that forum." 3 Therefore, plaintiff's
decision to recover the amount of payments in arrears through the
litigation process is not precluded by any provision in the agreement.
It is clear that the Egols' agreement did not directly and unequivocally
express that if the payments were to fall in arrears, the issue would be
one for arbitration. Thus, the arbitration clause in question should have
been read conservatively by the court. Had the court read the arbitration
of child support or maintenance ordered by the court must be withheld from the
income, regardless of source, of the person obligated to pay the support. For purposes
of this section, "modified" does not mean a cost-ofoliving adjustment without any
other modification of the support order.
1987 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 403 (West).
Such legislation will not allow for unilateral reduction of payments by the spouse who is
ordered to pay. Section 90, Modification, further provides that:
The terms of a decree respecting maintenance or support may be modified upon a
showing of one or more of the following: (1) substantially increased or decreased
earnings of a party; (2) substantially increased or decreased need of a party; (3)
receipt of assistance under sections 256.72 to 256.87, or (4) a change in the cost-of-
living for either party as measured by the federal bureau of statistics, any of which
makes the terms unreasonable and unfair....On a motion for modification of support,
the court shall take into consideration the needs of the children and shall not consider
the financial circumstances of each party's spouse, if any. A modification which
decreases support or maintenance may be made retroactive only with respect to any
period during which the support obligor has pending a motion for modification but
only from the date that notice of the motion has been given to the obligee and to
the court or other entity which issued each support order. A modification which
increases support or maintenance shall not be made retroactive if the obligor has
substantially complied with the previous order.
1987 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 403 (West).
72. Gangel v. De Groot, 41 N.Y.2d 840, 841, 362 N.E.2d 249, 250, 393 N.Y.S.2d
698, 699 (1977).
73. Egol v. Egol, 118 A.D.2d 76, 84, 503 N.Y.S.2d 726, 732 (1980) (Ellerin, J.,
dissenting in part) (emphasis in original).
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clause conservatively in light of the existing facts, it would not have
abrogated a right which it earlier recognized as having vested in the
plaintiff.
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision by the majority in Egol v. Egol is inappropriate in that
it compels the plaintiff to submit to arbitration an issue which is not
incorporated in the arbitration clause of the separation agreement. There
is nothing in the record which supports the position that Mrs. Egol
unequivocally agreed to have a dispute over arrearages included in the
agreement. Moreover, the record is void of any concrete evidence offered
by the defendant to indicate otherwise. Plaintiff's cause of action to
recover the arrearages was properly before the court and should have
been ruled upon accordingly.
Verdell L. Jordan

